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Introduction to Accounting and Business Research Special Issue 
Financial analysts’ role in valuation and stewardship 
Mark Clatworthy and Edward Lee 
 
Financial analysts intermediate in capital markets by bridging significant gaps in the 
information held by firms and investors. Through their valuation and monitoring activities, 
financial analysts are viewed by many as crucial in ensuring the efficient allocation of capital, 
increasing market liquidity and improving investor confidence. Yet despite their significance 
in the corporate information environment, analysts are also regularly criticised for lacking 
objectivity. Since the high profile corporate scandals of the early 2000s and the financial 
crisis of 2007-08, important concerns have been raised about financial analysts’ capabilities 
and effectiveness. Threats to analysts’ impartiality introduced by a need to maintain 
relationships with management and to help maximise brokerage and investment banking 
income are often accepted as inescapable features of the information environment.  
 
In light of these points, it is unsurprising that the literature on the financial analysts and their 
outputs is so vast. Researchers have exploited the availability of large databases to address 
various questions, such as how analysts perform relative to mechanical models in earnings 
forecasting, how influential analysts’ outputs are in security price formation and how 
successful analysts are in processing accounting information of various kinds. Nevertheless, 
there are important issues left untouched by academic research. The prior literature also 
stands accused of having a comparatively narrow topical and methodological focus (e.g. 
Bradshaw, 2011). Moreover, the regulatory and institutional environment of analysts is a 
highly dynamic one. We are therefore pleased to introduce this special issue of Accounting 
Business Research, with the wide variety of subjects it covers and the range of theoretical and 
methodological approaches taken to address them. 
 
Aiming to assess the validity of concerns about the rigour and objectivity of analysts’ 
research, Salzedo, Young and El-Haj (2018) apply manual content analysis and natural 
language processing methods to study the activities of U.S. sell-side analysts. They form 
predictions, based on the cognitive processing literature, that analysts are more likely to 
undertake rigorous research when the firms they follow receive unexpected news. This is 
particularly the case for unexpectedly poor earnings news. They provide empirical evidence 
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from conference call questions and research notes consistent with their predictions, and 
demonstrate that analysts often confront and challenge management, particularly when 
earnings performance is lower than expected. These findings differ from a prominent school 
of thought that analysts’ research tends not to be neutral and is institutionalized by material 
conflicts of interest, as well as excessive reliance on firms’ management (Fogarty and 
Rogers, 2005; Kothari et al., 2009; Huang et al., 2014). The research of Salzedo et al. (2018) 
has important implications for our understanding of analysts’ role in equity valuation because 
it indicates that analysts can be proactive, rather than passive in their research, and can 
therefore enhance the information available to investors (arguably when this role is needed 
most). The findings challenge some of the arguments about the lack of rigour of analyst 
research and the lack of analyst independence. The novel empirical examination of 
conference calls also exemplifies analysts’ active role in holding management accountable on 
investors’ behalf via verbal, rather than written, means. 
 
Ho, Strong and Walker (2018) examine whether and how analysts’ target price forecasts for 
U.K. firms respond to key information sources, including market returns, excess stock 
returns, and other analysts’ target price revisions. They document that, after controlling for 
analysts’ own concurrent earnings forecast and recommendation revisions, target price 
revisions are significantly associated with these factors, especially when bad news is 
conveyed. Their study answers calls for more research on analysts’ outputs beyond earnings 
forecasts (Bradshaw, 2011) and differs from other existing papers on target prices that tend to 
focus on the consequences, rather than determinants, of such forecasts (e.g. Brav and Lehavy, 
2003; Asquith et al., 2005). We infer from Ho et al. (2018) that when valuing equities, 
analysts incorporate and disseminate both market-wide and firm-specific information. Their 
findings also indicate that by being sensitive to firms’ strategic disclosure behaviour and 
tendencies to withhold negative information (Kothari et al., 2009), analysts contribute to 
investors’ monitoring against managerial opportunism. 
 
In a theoretical analysis, Schantl (2018) develops a model showing that analysts’ research can 
be either substitutive or complementary to corporate disclosure. Which role dominates 
depends on managerial incentives associated with their (uncertain) price interest and 
propensity to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts. The model suggests that the 
substitutive function of analysts’ research tends to dominate when the information cost is 
sufficiently low for analysts. An interesting feature of this model is that the analyst’s and 
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manager’s incentives interact with each other in such a way that the analyst’s forecast 
remains a potentially relevant information source, even after earnings are reported. The paper 
thus contributes to a large literature on financial analysts that tends to take a mainly empirical 
perspective, and which has so far generated conflicting evidence on whether analysts 
substitute or complements firms’ disclosures (Asquith et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2010). In 
examining the valuation role of analysts, Schantl (2018) suggests that the informativeness of 
analysts’ research outputs can be sensitive to their information acquisition costs. The model 
also identifies managerial incentives and opportunism as important determinants of analysts’ 
role as financial information intermediaries, thus questioning analysts’ stewardship 
capabilities. 
 
Chen, Wright, and Wu (2018) study the extractive industries in Australia to examine whether 
analysts’ private information and forecast performance are influenced by firms’ exploration 
and evaluation activities. Such activities are argued to be associated with a higher level of 
information asymmetry and may therefore lead to greater investor reliance on analysts’ 
expertise. The paper shows that the proportion of analysts’ private information increases with 
the intensity of exploration and evaluation, and that this effect is more pronounced among 
firms with limited production activities. Such evidence contributes to the literature on how 
analysts’ forecasts can be affected by intangible assets (Barth et al., 2001; Frankel et al., 
2006). This issue is increasingly important due to the rapid changes in technology and firms’ 
competitive environment. This study offers empirical support for the idea that analysts’ 
industry-specific experience and expertise represents an incremental contribution to 
investors’ information environment. The results also imply that analysts may improve the 
protection of investors in a high information asymmetry environment, where the risk of 
insider expropriation is potentially high. 
 
Yin, Peasnell and Hunt III (2018) seek to determine how analysts arrive at the price-earnings 
multiples they apply in their valuations. Based on U.S. data, they show that analysts are more 
likely to assign such multiples at a premium (discount) to firms that are anticipated to be 
associated with higher growth (risk). They interpret this as evidence that analysts’ valuation 
processes are broadly consistent with the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) abnormal 
earnings growth model. This study offers important insights into the implementation of a 
relative valuation approach, which existing research confirms is widely adopted by financial 
analysts (e.g. Demirakos et al., 2004; Cascino et al., 2014) and yet its underlying 
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determinants remain largely under-explored. Yin et al. (2018) thus provide reassuring 
evidence that relative valuation through price-earnings multiples is driven by economically 
important fundamental factors. Their study also implies that corporate disclosure of firm 
performance results in externalities for peer firms through analysts’ usage of a relative 
valuation approach that captures fundamental information associated with risk and growth. 
 
Even if analysts’ institutional environment were stable over time and across jurisdictions, we 
would still have much to learn about analysts’ roles in valuation and stewardship. But 
regulatory, economic, political and technological forces are dramatically shaping the world of 
the financial analyst and other capital market participants. The large and long-standing 
literature on financial analysts therefore still leaves a wealth of opportunities for future 
research. For instance, what factors enhance or inhibit financial analysts’ ‘early warning’ 
function over major capital market upheavals? What will be the effects of price-driven 
demand shocks on analysts’ roles? Will new regulatory interventions help ensure analysts 
mitigate the chances of another string of accounting scandals or the excessive risk taking that 
characterised the 2007-08 financial crisis? The new European Markets and Financial 
Instruments Directive has been designed to restructure and improve sell-side analyst research 
in fundamental ways, particularly by ‘unbundling’ it from other brokerage activities. Will this 
result in greater impartiality and higher research quality, as the regulators plan? Important 
policy reforms in emerging economies also represent worthy research settings to gain further 
insight into the determinants and consequences of analyst research.  
 
As the papers in this special issue illustrate, the predominant focus of existing academic 
literature is on sell-side equity analysts. As a result, there are potentially significant gaps in 
our knowledge of other types of analysts, such as buy-side equity analysts and credit analysts. 
It is far from clear that the findings from the sell-side carry over to other analyst types. 
Differences in security payoff structures, incentives, resources and responsibilities seem 
highly likely to influence the roles of these other important analysts. The regulatory 
interventions above may also alter these differences in significant ways. Finally, the 
information environment itself is evolving at pace. Increasing demand for non-financial 
information, together with the pervasiveness of technology in financial markets, have the 
potential to transform analysts’ roles even further, including changing the criteria by which 




In summary, there is significant evidence presented in the papers in this special issue that 
analysts perform important functions in both valuation and in enhancing stewardship, even 
though potential biases sometimes need to be adjusted for. Taken together, the papers show 
that the objectives, capabilities and roles of analysts are more complex than is sometimes 
assumed. Despite potential conflicts of interest, the consequences and implications of 
analysts’ incentives are not always easy to anticipate. The papers also identify and test the 
circumstances under which analysts’ role and performance varies, such as when firm 
performance is low, where firms withhold information and when information acquisition 
costs are low. We hope and expect that the papers in this issue will generate further debate 
and research into these important intermediaries and the roles they play in capital allocation. 
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